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Components of the Georgian National Idea: an Outline 
Since the 1980s, theoretical literature on nationalism has abounded, 
its most influential stars including Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, An-
thony Smith and Rogers Brubaker. The main thrust has been to problema-
tize the concept of nation as most people have tended to perceive it since the 
19th century. To reject, that is, the romanticized idea of a nation as an age-
old, pre-given entity one is supposed to speak of with awe. The new scholars 
of nations and nationalism disdain these approaches as “primoridialist” and 
“essentialist” - which, for them, is synonymous with unprofessionalism and 
inadequacy. On the other hand, most of Georgian intellectual tradition, in-
asmuch as it is preoccupied with the concept of the Georgian nation, takes 
the essentialist-primordialist approach for granted - even when authors dis-
play sharply critical attitudes towards different aspects of Georgian social or 
political realities. Georgian sociologists who teach contemporary theories of 
nationalism rarely apply them to Georgian material.1 The latter attempts are 
rare and mostly belong to foreign scholars.2 
The aim of this article is to propose a tentative trajectory of the evolu-
tion of the idea of the modern Georgian nation. I will not go into theoretical 
debates on nationalism but start by briefly summarizing my general approach 
towards the problem. Then I will proceed with a general description of two 
major components of the Georgian national idea: identity-building on the 
one hand, and the Georgian nation as a political project. 
This is a big-picture approach, with its broad generalizations not based 
on detailed research into the specific components. For the reasons listed 
above, there is a shortage of relevant research literature and the author did 
not have the time and opportunity to undertake such research himself. The 
value of a big picture, however, is that it may stimulate more specific and de-
tailed inquiry. 
Nation as a Platonic Idea
Every nation is unique. This is so as a matter of fact because each one 
carries a distinctive combination of geographical, historical and social-cultur-
al characteristics. But this is also so in the sense of self-awareness. It is crucial 
for any nation to feel unique. 
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At the same time, however, every nation is an imitation of the Platonic 
idea of nation. This idea is Platonic in the sense of being “objective”: People - 
including scholars keen to “deconstruct” it - treat it as a given, something that 
does not only float in an anonymous space of public consciousness (or the 
“third world”, as Karl Popper would have it3), but has power to reckon with 
(most scholars of nationalism believe this power to be devious and destruc-
tive, but this is another matter). There is another feature that makes this idea 
“Platonic”: it is productive. It has a capacity to produce its own emulations. 
But the same idea is not Platonic at all in that it was produced at a cer-
tain (and fairly recent) stage of historical development. The time of inception 
more or less coincides with that of modernization (or even late middle ages as 
precursor of modernity), while the actual birth is usually dated to the period 
of the French Revolution.4 A whole army of constructivist (“modernist”, “in-
strumentalist”) scholars examine the periods of pregnancy and delivery. They 
wonder who the true parents of this rather bad-tempered baby were, what 
defined its particular character, and so on.5 
There is one more non-Platonic feature about the idea of nation: It was 
not created as something separate, but simultaneously with the birth of those 
particular nations that happened to define what modernity is about. These are 
Britain, the United States, and France. 6 Admittedly, the idea of nation was a 
byproduct of these countries establishing themselves as modern nations. No 
political actors inspired by the idea of nation as such played any important 
role in their build-up. The people of the latter type we now call “nationalists”: 
They use the Platonic idea of nation as guidance for political action. Contrary 
to this, the founding fathers of the paradigmatic nations of modernity did not 
make any conscious effort to construct an idea of nation or build their coun-
tries in accordance with it.7 The idea developed out of the pragmatic needs 
of political modernization. The best symbol of such birth from necessity may 
be the moment when French soldiers went into battle shouting “vive là na-
tion” for the first time. For centuries, soldiers went to die for their kings and 
princes. But whom would they die for after the king was deposed and even 
beheaded? “Homeland” or “nation” appeared to be the most practical choice. 
The idea of nation took on its Platonic characteristics (that of the ideal 
model to be emulated by others) after paradigmatic nations that define the 
face of modernity took shape - a development which associated this idea with 
those of modernity, progress, success and power. For the British, Americans, 
or the French, the build-up of nations may be considered another byproduct 
of modernization. For others, it becomes a conscious - admittedly, ideologi-
cally driven - political project.8 Accordingly, there emerged nationalists, that 
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is, begetters of nations, and there appeared such terms as “national revival”, 
“nation-building”, “failed nations”, etc. 
This second category of nations - which is a large majority of the to-
tal - may be called latecomer or belated nations, in that they were late to mod-
ernize and had to develop their nationhood by emulating the pre-existing 
paradigm. Germany became the first such belated nation9 - one that became 
conscious of, and distressed by, being “late” and turned the idea of catching 
up into a major existential project.10 Hence, while Britain, the United States 
and France are paradigmatic modern nations, Germany created paradigmat-
ic modern nationalism. The extremely bad name that is associated with na-
tionalism nowadays is also primarily linked to the experience of German 
nationalism. 
But the spoiled reputation of nationalism resulted primarily from the 
experience of the two disastrous world wars of the 20th century. In the 19th 
century, when most national ideas were constructed - at least in Europe - it 
was still viewed mainly as the ideology of liberation and modernization. This 
was the period of liberal nationalism. It was in this context that the construc-
tion of the modern idea of Georgian nationhood started. 
How to Compose a National Identity 
Georgia is one of many belated nations. The modern idea of the Geor-
gian nation began developing in the 1860s in the circle of tergdaleulebi,11 peo-
ple educated in Russian universities, with one of them, Ilia Chavchavadze, 
deservedly being called ‘the father of the nation’.12 It was this circle of people 
who tried to construct a national idea emulating the Platonic model born out 
of the experience of western modernization. 
This does not by itself rule out the importance of pre-modern precur-
sors of the Georgian nation - or the idea of it. It is a widely accepted view 
among Georgian historians that “from the 10th to 14th century, Georgia rep-
resented a unified political and cultural space that constituted a self-aware-
ness of unified Georgia”.13 Some aspects of this opinion will certainly be 
contested within the constructivist-modernist paradigm, but if there indeed 
were any “nations before nationalism”,14 then the Georgia of that period was 
one of them. To use the language of 19th century discussions on nations, the 
modern Georgian nation was incepted as a historical one - that is, it could re-
fer to a long tradition of statehood and written language, and an autocephalic 
Church that used that language.15 To use Tony Judt’s phrase, Georgia had a 
considerable “usable past” that could go into the nation-building project.16
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However, the political, social and ideological context of modernity 
makes nations radically different from their pre-modern precursors. First of 
all, the latter are primarily patrimonies of kings and depend on strong and 
stable dynasties for their existence, while modern nations depend on a hori-
zontal sense of belonging among the people that constitute them. There-
fore, the “historical nations” have to reinvent themselves according the mod-
ern blueprint. Pre-modern cultural and political traditions serve as building 
blocks (albeit very important ones) for this new construction. The latter fol-
lows a guiding design, and this is what one may call the national idea.
So, what are the usual components of the Platonic idea of nation? Al-
though cases differ, there are several elements of key importance, including: 
Markers of identity. What are the features around which the sense of 
belonging is built? These features constitute the material, the meat, without 
which the idea of the nation can only be formal and shallow. These blocks are 
usually pre-modern (one could also call them ‘primordial’) components of the 
nation: Nobody can just invent, construct a territorial homeland, a historical 
record, language, religion, etc. Something should be there to start with. But 
all these things can be - rather should be - re-constructed and re-interpreted, 
in order to fit into a national design workable in the context of modernity. 
Politicians establish exact borders of the homeland, historians define what the 
national narrative is, grammarians and lexicographers define what the “norm” 
is and distinguish it from “dialect”, etc. 
The political project. Nation is a quasi-personality that needs a purpose 
around which its efforts and activities are concentrated. This may be rational-
ized as the task of preserving and expressing (projecting) national identity. 
Typically, this is the idea of a political home, or nation-state. The latter is not 
absolutely necessary, however. One could aspire to an autonomous unit with-
in a state, or a non-territorial package of “minority rights” for a given com-
munity. However, modesty usually stems from weakness and a nation settles 
for the lesser option when either the best one appears unattainable, or laying 
claim to it is too risky. On the other hand, national ambition may also sur-
pass the project of a nation state. It may seek, for instance, a role in defining 
the world order, or being a role model for less advanced peoples. 
The image of the other (“the Out-group”). - As we know from classical 
philosophy, determinacio est negatio: in order to define oneself (or exercise a 
right to self-determination) one has to distinguish oneself from the other. 
In practice, this may also require one to politically and territorially detach 
oneself from one’s imperial master. Therefore, it is usually (but not always) 




The role models. As belated nations are doomed to play catch up in order 
to overcome the development gap, they may also need specific role models 
(abstract Platonic ideas do not suffice). Sometimes, in a paradoxical way, role 
models also serve as political enemies (imperial masters bring modernization 
but they also become adversaries in the context of self-determination) - but 
it is preferable to have them for allies. 
The internal other. While trying to establish a the nation-state, as well 
as after this purpose is achieved, nations are usually forced to deal with those 
who reside in the national home but do not easily fit in because they do not 
share relevant identity markers. These are called national, ethnic, religious 
and linguistic minorities. Projects such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, assimi-
lation, and multiculturalism are typical strategies for resolving the issue. The 
choice of one of these options has deep implications for the result of the na-
tion-building effort. 
To be sure, other analysts may come up with different lists of ingredi-
ents, and I do not claim that the above constitutes a satisfactory description of 
the Platonic idea of the nation. But it may serve as a reasonably useful check-
list for an attempt to map the process and challenges of nation-building in 
some specific cases. I will now proceed by applying it to the Georgian case, 
focusing on two principal parts: One is about constituting a national identity, 
the other about defining the political project. 
Major markers of the Georgian identity 
In 1860, Ilia Chavchavadze proposed a triad that later acquired a sta-
tus of the formula of the Georgian nationhood: Fatherland, Language, Faith 
(mamuli, ena, sartsmunoeba). Chavchavadze wrote: “From our ancestors, we 
inherited the three sacred treasures: fatherland, language, and faith. If we do 
not even take good care of them, what kind of men are we, what will we be 
able to say to our heirs?”17 We cannot contend that Chavchavadze attached 
any formulaic meaning to this triad. In fact, he wrote these words in the con-
text of criticizing a bad Georgian translation of a bad Russian poem; he did 
not develop the idea beyond the quoted two phrases, and did not return to 
it in his later texts. However, the triad became the mandatory slogan in late 
1980s, when the mass Georgian national movement unfolded. This makes it 
an even more deserving subject for serious analysis.18 
The first important thing about the way in which the formula is intro-
duced is establishing the link between the primordial past and the future: Na-
tional identity as represented by the triad is “the treasure we inherited from 
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our ancestors”, but, most importantly, it is a major practical task to preserve 
these treasures and to pass them on to future generations. This is a paradig-
matic expression of the Platonic idea of nation, and a classic formulation of 
the nationalist program. 
Each element of the triad is a building block of the Georgian national 
identity: This makes it important to consider each of them separately, as well 
as to discuss the sequence in which they are introduced. Fatherland (mamuli) 
comes first, and it refers to territoriality of the nation - belonging is defined 
in terms of territory, the homeland. This is the essence of the modern, liber-
al territorial concept of nation.19 Importantly, Ilia Chavchavadze intention-
ally gave the term “mamuli” (patrimony, the land or estate of father) its new 
meaning - that of the translation of the French patrie, fatherland. Chavcha-
vadze wanted thus to replace the term samshoblo (the land of birth, primarily 
associated with the mother). The innovation did not stick: while mamuli is 
also used in today’s Georgian in more poetic and sublime contexts, samshoblo 
is a much more widely used term (also in patriotic texts, such as the Geor-
gian national anthem adopted in 2004). But Chavchavadze’s intention is it-
self significant: He wanted to associate the idea of Georgianness with some-
thing French - masculine, activist, rational, with the traits associated with the 
modern and powerful West. 
Thus, mamuli is the idea of nation as territorial but also active. It is 
about doing, pursuing some project, rather than just being there. The idea of 
“national awakening”, turning the nation from a passive to an active mode, 
to a mode of self-cultivation at the least, is as central to Ilia Chavchavadze’s 
thinking, as it typically is for many fathers of nationalisms. But apart from 
mamuli as the arena of national activism, one also needs a feature that unifies 
members of the nation. This is the Georgian language. This also makes Geor-
gian nationalism a typical “linguistic nationalism” of the European mold: that 
is a nationalism that considers language the main marker unifying members 
of a national community. 
It was absolutely necessary to stress the character of Georgian as a writ-
ten language of long history - to use Ernest Gellner’s terms, that of high cul-
ture rather than a ‘low’ or popular culture.20 Without this background, putting 
language forward in the context of the 19th century Georgia would have been 
a problem, as in at least two regions, people spoke different tongues, Megre-
lian and Svan, related to Georgian but incomprehensible to other Georgians. 
But those were and are vernaculars rather than written languages: when in 
need of reading the Bible or high literature, Megrelians and Svans also re-
verted to Georgian. That made the predominance of Georgian as the national 
language an obvious and uncontested choice. 
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For any linguistic nationalism, the language that is central to it should 
be a normative written language. Hence practical tasks of linguistic nation-
alisms, which Ilia Chavchavadze started to pursue in his lifetime: to con-
solidate normative (written) Georgian as distinct from dialects. For western 
European linguistic nationalisms, it was typically the translation of the Bible 
into the national vernacular (rather than Latin) that served as the turning 
point. Georgia of the 19th century was both ahead and behind in this regard: 
the Bible had long been available in Georgian, but within the Russian em-
pire, the Georgian Orthodox Church was deprived of its autocephalic status 
and the Georgian language was no longer used in church services. Therefore, 
the action plan was to develop Georgian as a language of secular literature; 
to educate Georgians in this normative language; to make it the dominant 
language in mamuli, that is the administratively unmarked Georgian terri-
tory21, or at least to make it effectively compete with Russian, the language 
of the imperial state. Ilia Chavchavadze stated these tasks and started to im-
plement some of them: For instance, by founding, together with his associ-
ates, the Society for Spreading Literacy among Georgians, which Oliver Reisner 
called “the school of the Georgian nation”.22 But the program could only be 
effectively implemented later. Paradoxically, the most important steps were 
taken in Soviet Georgia, when normative grammar and dictionaries were cre-
ated and Georgian became the language of universal mass education. The task 
was completed in the independent post-Soviet Georgia when Georgian was 
finally established the language of the bureaucracy.23
The inclusion of sartsmunoeba - faith or religion - into the triad, as 
well as consigning it to the third place after mamuli and language, indicates 
a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards religion within the nascent Geor-
gian nationalism. On the one hand, the formative importance of religion in 
the buildup of Georgian nationhood is all too obvious. As they usually say in 
Georgia, “It is Orthodox Christianity that has preserved Georgia [through-
out the Middle Ages].” This is fully true, as from the downfall of Byzantium 
until the arrival of Russia, it was Christianity that distinguished Georgia 
within its Islamic neighborhood (Armenians, the only Christian neighbors, 
were also denominationally different). The importance of language as the 
main marker of nationhood was also dependent on Christianity since the 
status of the Georgian language largely depended on its being the language 
of the autocephalic Georgian Church. Giorgi Merchule, an important reli-
gious leader of the 10th century, defined Georgia (Kartli) as the land where 
they preach in Georgian, and this may be the most workable definition of the 
pre-modern Georgian nationhood.24  
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However, constructing the Georgian national idea in the context of the 
19th century Russian Empire was not conducive to strengthening the role of 
religion within the national identity. First of all, this would not fit into the 
paradigm of liberal 19th century nationalism which Chavchavadze was emu-
lating: It would be against the positivistic Zeitgeist of the 19th century.25 
Moreover, highlighting Orthodox Christianity did not work well in a 
specific practical sense. The major task of identity-building was to distinguish 
the nascent Georgian nation from its imperial master. Evidently, Orthodox 
Christianity was not very useful for that purpose, as it stressed Georgia’s unity 
with Russia, not its distinctiveness. Tsarist Russia deprived the Georgian Or-
thodox Church of its autocephalic status and incorporated it into the Russian 
Church. Therefore, the Church could not be used as an institutional ground 
for consolidating the Georgian nationhood. 
An additional factor against putting emphasis on the Orthodox re-
ligion emerged in 1877, when, following a war with the Ottoman Empire, 
Russia annexed Achara, the southwestern province inhabited by Islamicized 
Georgians. This created the practical task of incorporating this territorial and 
cultural unit into the construction of the modern Georgian nation. The new 
reality prompted Chavchavadze to propose a modified concept of the Geor-
gian identity, based primarily on the idea of history. In 1877, as he welcomed 
the annexation of Achara, he wrote: “In our opinion, neither the commonal-
ity of language, nor that of faith and kinship does create as strong a sense of 
belonging together, as the unity of history”.26 This attitude of Ilia Chavcha-
vadze strongly resonates with that of Ernest Renan as expressed in Qu’est-ce 
qu’une nation? , the seminal text of liberal nationalism that Renan delivered 
as a lecture in 1882.27 
The idea of the common history as the centerpiece of national identity 
relativizes the importance of such ‘hard’ markers as language and religion. For 
instance, it makes it much easier for Megrelians or Acharans to fully belong 
to the Georgian nation despite their linguistic or religious otherness. This at-
titude led to the eventual success of the nation-building project. Today both 
groups are fully fledged parts of the Georgian national community not only 
politically, but identity-wise as well. But the centrality of history does not 
cancel the importance of the aforementioned ‘hard’ markers either. In order to 
be coherent and successfully instill the sense of common belonging, the his-
torical narrative requires some recurrent themes. Mamuli, ena, sartsmunoeba 
provide them: The narrative of national history is about Georgians fighting 
for their homeland, their language and their faith. 
There is one more important ingredient of national identity that is con-
spicuously absent from the Chavchavadze triad and from our discussion so 
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far, but not from the minds of most Georgians or most nationalists world-
wide. This is common descent, which is also referred to the community of 
blood, the nation as a racial unit, or, as quite a few contemporary Georgians 
put it, “the Georgian gene”. Presumably, Ilia Chavchavadze was an enlight-
ened enough man to understand that relying on genes in nation-building 
is absurd - especially provided the history of Georgian lands, where “genes” 
have mixed handsomely for ages. The most prominent intellectual who later 
based Georgian identity on the idea of race was writer and essayist Grigol 
Robakidze, who was apparently influenced by the European, especially Ger-
man, writings on race. In The Snakeskin, his programmatic novel of 1928, he 
describes Archibald McAsh, an English national, rediscovering his Georgian 
racial roots and triumphantly returning to his true national-racial self as Ar-
chil Makashvili.28 Robakidze and some other Georgians active in the Geor-
gian émigré community in the1920s and 1930s reinterpreted the Georgian 
national idea based on the Italian and German fascist/Nazi concepts that 
were in vogue then. 
The emphasis on the racial component of nationhood appeared quite 
strong when the Georgian nationalism emerged from its state of hibernation 
under the Soviet rule - the first Georgian president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
was often accused of carrying elements of fascistic ideology. However, this 
was not about his personality - he represented a trend in the Georgian na-
tional movement of that time in general. After Gamsakhurdia’s overthrow in 
1992, insistence on centrality of the racial element of Georgianness became 
less fashionable on the political level. Despite this, references to the “Geor-
gian gene” remain conspicuous in the public discourse. 
The last important case when the issue of the racial concept of Geor-
gian nationhood became politically relevant was a lengthy discussion on the 
entry for (ethnic) “nationality” in official identity documents for Georgian 
citizens in 1999-2000. This was about keeping or removing the residue of 
the Soviet past, when “nationality” understood in the sense of ethnic belong-
ing was separated from citizenship and entered in all identity documents. 
The liberals, represented by the reformist wing of the then ruling Citizens’ 
Union party (who later joined the opposition and came to power as a result 
of the 2003 Rose Revolution) wanted to get rid of that heritage and intro-
duce “ethnicity-blind” identification documents; they were opposed by ethnic 
nationalists who saw in the reform a conspiracy against the Georgian iden-
tity. Although public opinion appeared to be on the side of the latter, the re-
formers won. 
Another important change in the interpretation of the Georgian iden-
tity brought on by the period of the national movement concerns the role of 
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Orthodox Christianity. The fathers of post-Soviet Georgian nationalism cer-
tainly did not pay heed to the fact that “faith” was number three in the order 
of importance in the Chavchavadze triad. On the contrary, belonging to the 
Orthodox Christian Church became the leading identity marker. Since the 
1990s, no Georgian politician has been able to achieve success without dem-
onstrating his or her religiosity and closeness to the Church. The notion that 
only an Orthodox Christian could be a ‘true’ Georgian, hence all others had 
to convert, was frequently expressed. Facts of intolerance - especially against 
those ethnic Georgians who profess religions other than Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity, started to abound, peaking in late 1990s. 
Trying to explain this apparent contrast with the more liberal spirit of 
Georgian nationalism as first constructed by Ilia Chavchavadze would re-
quire lengthy discussion, though the very fact that there was a change is ob-
vious enough. The reasons may be sought both in the general Zeitgeist as well 
in specifically Georgian conditions. In the late 20th century, religion became 
much more politically prominent more or less everywhere, making the En-
lightenment project of secularization considered all but obsolete. More spe-
cifically for our case, the Georgian Orthodox Church, following the break-
up of the Tsarist empire, had regained its autocephalic status, so it became 
an important national institution that could play a role in the independence 
movement (which it could not in Tsarist Russia). Last but not least, given the 
lack of the culture of consensus and cooperation in Georgian politics and the 
resulting polarization of the political elite and society, the Church remains 
almost the only unifying institution, or at least by far the most important one. 
Here, however, we are moving to discussion of the political element of 
the idea of nation. It is time to focus on it. 
Georgia as a Political Project 
Defining the cultural markers of identity - and the task of preserving 
them - is central to nationalism at its early stage when it is not yet dominat-
ed by its political agenda.29 However, it is the idea of the nation-state that is 
the true centerpiece of the Platonic idea of the nation. Moving from the cul-
tural to the political is also the typical trajectory for the development of the 
national idea in the “belated” nations. In the Georgian case, the national idea 
developed into a political project in the early 20th century, when the concept 
of an autonomous Georgia within the Russian empire was put forward by a 
group of people that were called “the autonomists”. This proved only a short 
transitory stage in the development of Georgian political nationalism. Since 
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the first Georgian independence of 1918-21, the Georgian nation-state be-
came the only normatively acceptable condition for the Georgians, the only 
proper way to take care of the “sacred treasures” inherited from the ancestors. 
The first Georgian republic of 1918 was short-lived and the attitude of 
Georgians towards it is somewhat ambiguous. Its Social-Democratic leaders 
do not enjoy the status of heroes in today’s Georgia, because they had never 
supported nationalist agenda before independence but were forced to become 
nationalists by default following the failure of first the Russian empire and, 
later, the Transcaucasian Federation. They proclaimed an independent repub-
lic, the critics say, because it was the only remaining option. Being reluctant 
nationalists, they were also blamed for not defending independence from the 
Russian Bolsheviks, their ideological kin, vigorously enough. 
Despite this, it was the short-lived First Republic that has defined the 
design of the Georgian political project whose main outline persists to this 
day. Here are its major guidelines (as modified according to today’s context): 
1) The Georgian nation-state is the only acceptable political 
framework for the development of the Georgian nation;
2) Europe or the West in general (these two terms are not 
conceptually divided) serves as the provider of a larger 
(framework) identity, as the role model, and the presumed 
ally. This means that: (a) By its essence, Georgia is part 
of Europe, it should be recognized as such and be part 
of main institutions of the West such as NATO and the 
European Union; (b) the West serves as a blueprint for 
the construction of the Georgian state - that is, it is only 
legitimate as a democratic state. If it does not fully conform 
to this normative framework yet, it is on the way to doing so; 
(c) the West is Georgia’s main friend, ally, and protector. 
3) Russia should be just another neighboring country 
with whom Georgia should have friendly though not 
preferential relations. In fact, however, it is the main 
adversary, as it tries to undermine the Georgian state 
through direct intervention or through exacerbating 
internal Georgian problems (see the next point). 
4) Georgia is a tolerant country that accepts and recognizes 
culturally distinct ethnic minorities on its territory but demands 
from them loyalty to the Georgian national project as defined 
above. Granting them territorial autonomy is undesirable 
but acceptable if necessary. The presence of minorities may 
become a challenge to it (as it is the case for any country) 
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but Georgia is fully capable of handling this unless outside 
actors (in practice - Russia) deliberately infuse tensions. 
Despite all the differences between the first Georgian republic of 1918-
21 and the post-Soviet period, as well as important differences among the 
political regimes of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil 
Saakashvili, these points constitute invariable guidelines of the Georgian na-
tional project. It is the context and capacities that evolve - for instance, the 
willingness and ability of the West to support Georgia, the willingness and 
ability of Russia to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty, the capacity of differ-
ent governments to handle the minorities’ problem properly. These guide-
lines are also rather similar to those of many other nations, especially those 
in Eastern Europe, that developed their national projects in approximately 
the same timeframe as the Georgians. The main difference from the latter is 
that most countries in Eastern Europe have mainly fulfilled their national 
aspirations and there are no other grand nationalist projects to pursue, while 
with Georgia, the agenda is still incomplete. The real borders of the state and, 
with them, the composition of the national community are still to be estab-
lished; the West still has to recognize Georgia as its part and parcel and ad-
mit it to its institutions (NATO and the EU); Russia has still to reconcile 
itself to the idea that Georgia is now a separate state that is entitled to make 
sovereign decisions. 
The resilience of the main ideas of the Georgian political project is not 
based on some material necessity or strict logic that infers Georgia’s nation-
al interests and policies from interests and aspirations of its individual citi-
zens. Theoretically, one could easily imagine Georgia taking another course 
on fundamental issues. During the twilight of the Soviet Union, many west-
erners wondered why Georgians were so bent on the idea of having an inde-
pendent state instead of focusing on supposedly more important tasks such 
as developing new democratic and market institutions in cooperation with 
Russian democrats. There are Georgian intellectuals who question the idea 
that Georgia is really a European country and give preference to a view that 
Georgia is some kind of synthesis or bridge between the West and the East. 
Surely, Georgian history and culture may provide some evidence for this 
viewpoint as well. There are Georgians - including some politicians - who 
think that Georgia’s recent woes arise from its being rude to Russia and it 
would be much more rational to give up silly aspirations like joining NATO. 
And a rational case can be made in favor of the idea that it would be more 
sensible for Georgia to recognize Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s indepen-
dence, thus depriving Russia of its last excuse to meddle in Georgia’s affairs, 
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and concentrate on internal development (again: develop democracy, attract 
investment, etc). 
One could imagine Georgia taking some of these options, and there 
may be Georgians who favor them right now. One can never be sure about 
the future, and there is always another way. Still, the fact of the matter is that 
the attitudes and policy directions that I have described as “the national proj-
ect” have proved rather stable, while their opponents are kept invariably mar-
ginal in Georgia. Admittedly, the experience of Georgia as well as of many 
other countries is that once the main tenets of national projects are consoli-
dated, they tend to persist. A social scientist may call this “path dependency”, 
or look for some other explanation, but that’s another matter. 
As it is also typical for quite a few “belated nations”, Georgian nation-
alism has served as the principal force of modernization and westernization 
of the country. In lieu of genuinely entrenched pluralistic institutions, the 
combination of civil nationalism with the thrust towards westernization re-
mains the main hope for maintaining the existing modicum of liberal demo-
cratic order in Georgia. But in the eyes of most westerners, this also implies 
a paradox. For Georgians, nationalism and the wish to integrate into Europe 
come naturally together. But the Europe Georgians want to integrate into 
is supposedly “post-national”. To say it in other terms, nationalism is one of 
the main ideas of modernity; while the West - at least this is what most in-
tellectuals believe - is now “post-modern”. Nationalism is supposed to be re-
placed by multiculturalism. It is the European Union that epitomizes post-
modernity - especially its post-national character. In the West, the Platonic 
idea Georgia still strives to emulate is already dead. 
Or is it? Twenty years ago, people spoke of the same paradox with re-
gard to the Baltic experience: Their nationalist movements also strived to 
“return to Europe” in which nationalists were considered marginal and back-
ward people. So what? The Baltic countries are still led by the more or less 
same leaders espousing similar ideas, but they are normal EU member-states 
producing completely acceptable functionaries for EU institutions. The para-
dox exists more in the eyes of idealistic intellectuals than in the reality. The 
European Union did indeed modify the idea of the nation for its members, 
and in many ways it removed the sharpness of European nationalisms. But, 
first of all, this effect becomes valid for those who are inside it, not neces-
sarily for the aspirant candidates. Secondly, even for the former it would be 
a gross exaggeration to say that their nationalisms are dead. To the contrary 
- they may be resurging. European liberal multiculturalists feel increasingly 
squeezed in the ever narrowing space between the strengthening European 
anti-immigrant right on the one hand and anti-liberal thrust of defiant mi-
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nority sentiment on the other. Apart from these two paths, the nationalist 
spirit in Europe is alive and kicking in several other manifestations: outspo-
ken anti-Americanism of the European elites, more quiet but tenacious tra-
ditional European nationalisms that have apparently sent the dream of the 
federal Europe to the dustbin of history, or persistent European separatisms 
such as Basque, Scottish or Flemish. 
So, it would be naive for Georgians to be embarrassed about their not-
yet-postmodern-enough nationalism and try getting rid of it in favor of re-
cycled European multiculturalist dreams that are losing credit in their mul-
tiple homelands. At this moment there is no ground to expect that Georgia 
will change its national project - at least without very direct intervention from 
Russia, and probably even that would not help. If this is so, Georgia will con-
tinue striving to achieve more of the same: Develop and maintain effective 
and stable state institutions at the same time making them more pluralistic 
(not easy to achieve at all), integrate into the West against all odds (a rather 
challenging task), make the Georgian civic nation more inclusive (possible 
but not easy), not to allow internal conflicts to unravel the Georgian dream 
(even more difficult). 
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